This means that, under the current FAPL system, individual negotiations take place between clubs and individual players and their agents. The authorization to use the “offensive lockout” marked the next and most important step in the development and expansion of the lockout. In American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that employers can block employees in order to gain more influence at the bargaining table. The Court held that “the law contains nothing that gives workers the right to insist on their contractual claims, without prejudice to the type of economic disadvantage that often participates in collective disputes” (313). The Court found that the admission of offensive, but non-defensive, blows caused an unfair and unnecessary asymmetry in labour negotiations and concluded that “the use of a lockout exclusively in support of a legitimate bargaining position by the employer is in no way inconsistent with the right to collective strike or with the right to strike” (310). I loved the class and ethical compass of Dr. Lashbrook and the SMWW staff. The course was informative, interactive and entertaining. The course gave me the basic tools to be comfortable working with athletes. I would advise this class for anyone who has a passion for sport. The cost of the class is minimal compared to the knowledge and contacts you get in return.

The NFL-NFLPA dispute at Brady (and the relatively short NBA-NBPA fight at Anthony v. NBA) have clearly defined the key issue in the recent phase of the dispute between players and owners and between labor law and antitrust rules – does the non-legal labor exemption immunize a lockout of antitrust attacks after the dissolution of a union? Resolving these and related issues can help shape the pricing relationship between players and owners for decades to come and tip the balance on either players or owners. If the non-legal exemption ends with the dissolution of the union, the owners` lockout loses some of their power, as players waive (or threaten) their labour rights to gain access to antitrust legislation. If the exception is sufficient after the dissolution, the lockout will retain its strength and aggressive negotiations by professional sports owners will likely continue. While multi-employer negotiations are an effective mechanism for professional teams, it raises questions about the law of the cartel, as the multi-employer unit is essentially an agreement between the owners. Collective agreements in professional sports leagues are therefore not only an agreement between the players and the league, but also an agreement between the teams within the league. For example, free agency restrictions in the NFL are the result of an agreement between players and owners and between the owners themselves (as part of the multi-employer bargaining unit). The work tactics of the multi-employer unit – including lockouts – is also an agreement between the owners. These agreements are in turn subject to review by Section 1 of the Sherman Act. From the outset, the NLRB found that lockouts are only permitted if they are motivated by legitimate business reasons and when the lockout “does not affect the right of workers to organize and engage in other concerted activities protected by law” (Feldman, 2012 839 (citing Great Falls Employers` Council, Inc., 123 N.L.B R.R. at 978).). Lockouts intended to disrupt or harm unions were deemed destructive to the collective bargaining process and declared illegal.